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We investigate the relationship between training and the likelihood of commercial 
survival over a 7-year period, using a survey of British establishments. We find that in 
establishments of 200 or more employees, increased training of those in Professional, 
Sales, and Clerical and Secretarial occupations is associated with a greater chance of 
survival. In smaller establishments of less than 200 employees, increased training for 
Operatives and Assembly workers, Personal and Protective Service workers, and Craft 
and Technical workers is associated with better chances of survival. We interpret these 
findings as suggesting that training for these groups generated above-normal returns and 
indicates under-investment in training by such firms. There is no evidence to suggest 








Training and Establishment Survival 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines the association between training and the commercial survival of 
establishments, in order to throw light on the relationship between employer training 
and company performance. In most industrialised countries, very large numbers of 
workers undertake some type of job-related training each year. For the most part, 
employers pay substantially for this training (Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1998; Green, 
1999). To receive or impart training, employees are disengaged fully or partially from 
productive activities, normally while still receiving wages. Equipment and courses have 
to be paid for. The cost of continuing vocational training in EU countries in 1999 
ranged from around 1½  to 3 per cent of total labour costs (Nestler and Kailis, 2002) 
equivalent at the top end of this scale to around 1400 Euro per employee. Another 
estimate puts the total cost to employers in Britain at around £1,300 per employee in 
2000 (Spilsbury, 2001): this adds up to approximately £23 billion, which is more than 
half the public education budget.
1 We may presume that the general intention of all this 
training is both to produce those work skills that education could not (or did not) 
provide and to meet new skill needs arising from changing technology, and hence that 
there is a financial benefit to the training to be set against the large cost.  
Yet, to substantiate this rational view of training, it would be useful to have evidence as 
to the existence and extent of employer returns to training investments. If the 
distribution of these returns were known by firms, in a stable market equilibrium the 
quantity of training would be expected to respond to the expected returns, and so the 
                                                 
1 The investment is unequally distributed among occupational groups; typically, 
managers and professionals receive training most frequently, while large numbers of 
manual workers never receive any continuing training after a period of induction.  
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returns to training would adjust towards the normal rate of return. However, though 
many firms evaluate their own training expenditures, the benefits in terms of 
productivity gains or of profits rises are typically extremely hard or impossible to 
measure, even ex post.
2  Thus the uncertainty surrounding a firm's investment in skills 
might best be characterised as pure uncertainty (in the sense of Knight) rather than as 
risk with a known probability distribution.  
Given the lack of information facing all parties, there is no reason to expect that the 
return to training will converge to the normal rate of return. Because it is hard for a firm 
to assess the impact of its training expenditures on profits, the consequence could be 
either an over-investment or an under-investment in training. A typical argument is 
heard that “short-termist” firms will accord disproportionate weight to known current 
training expenditures, and less weight to unknown future benefits. If that is the case, 
such firms are likely to under-invest in human capital, that is, to train less than the 
optimal amount. This would be observed as an above-normal rate of return to training. 
Yet, it is equally possible that employers could be putting undue faith in the efficacy of 
training, especially since we do observe ostensibly very large sums being invested in 
this way. In that case the returns to training would be below normal. This paper seeks to 
investigate which of these scenarios on average prevails, using an economic model and 
formal statistical methods with a large, representative establishment-level data set. 
Knowledge of the link between training and company performance is a useful input into 
policy making. If, for example, the returns to training are found to be high for a 
particular group of workers, this supports policies that make use of this information to 
                                                 
2 Within a firm, the human resource department would typically carry out such 
evaluations; there is sometimes an incentive for that department to justify training 
expenditures as having benefits in bidding for further resources. The decision to spend 
money on training is sometimes described by employers as an "act of faith".  
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encourage increased training (though not necessarily for subsidies). If, by contrast, the 
returns are less than normal, one could infer that firms may be spending too much on 
training (though, since training has externalities and may be credit-constrained, the 
training could still be too low from society's point of view (Stevens, 1999)). The 
dissemination of information about the effectiveness or otherwise of different types of 
training can thus be a public good.
3 
Although there is evidence that training raises wages and productivity, there is only 
very limited evidence concerning its impact on company profits. Formal estimates of 
the rate of return to employer training range from 7 per cent to 50 per cent. These 
estimates are based, however, on records from a small number and range of US 
companies. It would thus seem unsafe as yet to draw strong general conclusions about 
how the returns to training compare with normal rates of return. In this paper we 
examine the relationship between training and profits indirectly, by exploiting 
information on plant closure in a panel of British establishments. The presumption is 
that, if investment in training has an above-normal rate of return for the establishment, 
the training will enable the establishment to survive longer. The converse also applies: 
if training expenditures are too high, this could lead to lower profits. The data afford 
detailed measures of the annual training given to each of the various occupational 
groups in the organisation. We provide, for the first time, evidence for an association 
between training and establishment survival, and hence indirectly with profitability. 
Since the survey data are drawn from all (private) sectors of the British economy 
                                                 
3 Such has been the implicit rationale of a number of UK government policy initiatives 
in recent decades, which have sought to foster training through the dissemination of best 
practice, and the promotion of employer training as good for employers; the advantage 
from government's point of view is that such policies rarely entail large expenditures. 
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(subject to a minimum of 25 employees in the establishment), our findings can be 
regarded as applicable in a wide range of contexts. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II presents a brief overview 
of the small body of evidence on the relationship between training and appropriate 
measures of economic performance. Section III presents a simple model of the relation 
between training, profits and establishment survival. Section IV describes the data and 
methodology. Section V discusses the empirical results. Section VI presents extensions 
whilst Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Previous Evidence on Training and Economic Performance of Firms and Their 
Employees. 
There is now an established body of evidence that employer training benefits employees 
through increased wages (e.g. Blundell et al, 1996; Bartel, 1995 ; Green et al, 1996)
4. 
The magnitude of estimates differ, reflecting differences in the training measures and in 
training quality across data sets. There is also growing evidence to support the view that 
training has positive effects on individual or organisational productivity (e.g. Holzer et 
al, 1993, for the US, Zwick , 2002, for Germany or Alba-Ramirez, 1994, for Spain).
5 An 
exception, notable because of the high quality of its data base, is the finding reported by 
Lynch and Black (1995, 2001) that the numbers of employees in training in US 
manufacturing establishments had no significant impact on contemporaneous 
productivity.
6 Bishop (1994) and Dearden et al (2000) agree with each other in finding 
                                                 
4 Overviews are provided by Barrett et al (1998), Bishop (1997) and Green (1997). 
5 Bartel (2000) gives an overview. 
6 Lynch and Black do find that IT use by non-managerial staff raises productivity, and 
link this to human capital investment by the firm. 
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that productivity gains are greater than employees' wage gains. We should expect the 
organisational productivity gains to exceed employees' wage gains, for two reasons. 
First, if employers are to obtain a positive return to training, unit labour costs need to 
fall. Second, we expect there to be benefits to training that are external to the individual 
trainee but internal to the organisation. This expectation is consistent with assumptions 
sometimes made in endogenous growth models. It also concurs with findings about the 
function of training within the process of work-based learning (Eraut et al, 1998), where 
training has been found to be a gateway through which knowledge and expertise enter 
the organisation. Company training also has some modest effects on other indirect 
indicators of performance such as labour turnover and mobility (Dearden et al, 1996; 
Green et al, 2000). 
Yet, lacking information on training costs, the above studies do not generate estimates 
of any impact of training on financial performance. This objective is achieved by two 
"econometric case studies", where findings are based on individual performance data 
drawn from a company's internal records, including cost data. Bartel (1995) computes 
rates of return ranging from 7 to 50 per cent for a large manufacturing company; while 
estimates from Krueger and Rouse (1998) imply a return of 7 to 9 per cent (Bartel 
(2000). In both studies, training's effect is derived from the impact on individuals' 
performance in the first year after training. The range of estimates depends in part on 
assumptions made about skill depreciation. 
Also relevant are studies that find an impact of human resource management policies on 
performance. Although the evidence is mixed, influential studies by Huselid (1995), 
Huselid and Becker (1996) and by Ichniowski et al (1997) point to the conclusion that 
introducing modern human resource management systems that include high training 
levels tend to raise profits. Michie and Sheehan-Quinn (2001) also find a positive  
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correlation between HRM systems that include training and a subjective measure of 
financial performance. Ichniowski et al find the impact of the choice of HRM systems 
to be large, and argue that it is only the switching costs of moving to a high 
performance system that prevents firms exploiting the profit gains. An alternative 
argument is that firms may be unaware of the potential gains. In these studies, the 
impact of training is likely to be greater if accompanied by other elements of a human 
resource policy bundle, such as consultative committees or appraisal schemes. 
Nevertheless, the precise impact of training within systems of HRM is unclear, since the 
studies typically do not present estimates of the effects of training both separately and 
interacted with other policies. We are thus unable to draw from this literature 
substantial conclusions about employer returns to training. 
In short, considering the size of the investment, remarkably little is known about the 
impact of employer training on the financial performance of companies. Moreover, no 
existing studies directly examine longer term impacts of training. In this study, by 
taking as our dependent variable whether or not an establishment has survived for at 
least seven years, we look indirectly at a possible medium term impact of training on 
financial performance. In contrast to the indicators used in the previous literature (such 
as management evaluations of employees), the commercial survival or failure of an 
establishment is an objective indicator of performance.  We have detailed indicators of 
whether each of nine occupational groups within establishments are given training and, 
if so, what proportions of employees are trained. We are thus able to derive estimates of 
training's association with establishment survival, and thereby infer conclusions about 
its possible medium-term impact on financial performance. We are also able to 
distinguish between the effects of training different sections of the workforce.  
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Hitherto, studies of workplace closure have (to our knowledge) not considered any 
potential role for employer training. The emphasis of some studies has been on whether 
unionism is detrimental to establishment survival (Machin, 1995; Bryson, 2001), or, 
relatedly, whether plant closure is linked to conflict in industrial relations (Kirkham et 
al, 1999). Such studies also focus on the role of greater market power and/or better 
financial performance in reducing the chances of plant closure. Other researchers have 
emphasised the importance of entry size and of early entry in the product life cycle 
(Klepper and Simons, 2000), the stock of professional and technical workers at the 
establishment together with investments in research and development (Hage et al, 
1993), and the role of higher technology and ownership (Colombo and Delmastro, 
2001; Agarwal, 1996), in reducing the chances of closure. 
 
  III. A Model of the Effects of Training on Economic Performance and 
Establishment Survival 
To examine the relationship between training, profitability and establishment survival, 
we first develop a simple model of how the training decision depends on beliefs about 
the efficacy of training. For this purpose we abstract from issues of endogenous 
recruitment and retention, and treat training as in effect firm-specific; there is thus no 
difficulty in rationalising why firms have an incentive to invest in training.
7 We 
consider a simple two period model. In the first period, the plant has a fixed labour 
force L1, faces a fixed wage of w and has the decision what proportion of the labour 
                                                 
7 A number of reasons are afforded in recent literature as to why firms pay for training, 
the main ones being informational asymmetries and frictions in the labour market, 
which can render even genuine training effectively specific. See for example Stevens, 
(1994) or Acemoglu and Pischke  (1999).  
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force, t, to train at a cost c per worker. The profits in the first period, Π1, are known 
precisely at  
1   =    11 1 1 REV (L )   -  w L   -  t c L Π  
The revenue function REV1 depends on the fixed labour force, the production function 
and implicitly allows for price to fall with increased output.  
The profits in the second first period, Π2, have a probability distribution as the 
management is unsure about the increased efficiency of labour after training, f(t).  
  =    2 21 1 REV (L , f(t))   -  w L Π  
The management have a perception about the probability density function for Π2  - this 
is given by  2 (t, ) φ Π .
8 For higher t, the density function  2 (t, ) φ Π  first order 
stochastically dominates density functions for lower t.  
It is commonly assumed that the objective of a firm is to maximise profits. In the case 
of a firm with a number of plants, the central management will wish to expand those 
parts of the firm that are profitable and close down unprofitable parts – this view of the 
organisation of multi-divisional firms was first proposed by Williamson (1970). Thus, 
the manager of a specific plant will wish to be as profitable as possible to avoid closure 
by the central management or through take-over/merger. Similarly, for the case of a 
single plant firm, the management will wish to maximise profits so as to avoid closure 
through bankruptcy or take-over. A proxy for profitability of an establishment is the 
probability of survival. Consequently, one can consider the effects of training on 
profitability through the relation of training to the probability of survival.  
                                                 
8 If labour turnover consequent upon training were also an issue, management’s 
uncertainty about the extent of this could be incorporated in φ , without affecting the 
model’s implications.  
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In this model we consider the motivation of management to be of survival across the 
two periods.  The establishment can be closed at the end of the first or second period. 
The establishment survives through making profits and greater profits increase the 
likelihood of survival. We assume that the probability of survival to the end of the 
second period depends on profits in both periods and is given by  12 P( (t), )  Π Π . This 
function is assumed to be known exactly by the management.  
The decision about training is modelled through maximising the probability of survival 
with respect to the proportion of the labour force trained. The expected survival 
probability, S, is given by  
12 2 2 S  =   P( (t),  )   (t,  ) d  
u
l
φ Π ΠΠ Π ∫  
2 where   and   are the lowest and highest possible bounds for   whatever t lu Π . 
Maximisation of the expected survival probability is given by differentiation with 
respect to t of the above expression (a superscript on a variable represents 
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The first term in (1) represents the marginal reduction in survival probability arising 
from the reduced first period profits; the second term is the marginal increase in 
survival probability arising from increased second period profits. 
The solution of this condition, t*, depends on the perception of the probability density 
function  2 (t, ) φ Π . It is instructive to consider two establishments, A and B, with 
probability density functions,  A2 (t, ) φ Π and  B2 (t, ) φ Π , which differ in how “optimistic” 
they are about the effects of training labour. Optimism is defined in terms of first order 
stochastic domination with respect to the functions  2 (t, ) φ Π and 
t
2 (t, ) φ Π . We say that 
A is more optimistic than B if:  
A22 B22    (t,  ) d          (t,  ) d          
uu
xx
x φφ ΠΠ ≥ ΠΠ ∀ ∫∫      (2a) 
t
A22 B22    (t,  ) d          (t,  ) d          
uu t
xx
x φφ ΠΠ ≥ ΠΠ ∀ ∫∫      (2b) 
Condition 2a is that the more optimistic view of the probability density function gives 
higher probability mass to higher second period profits. Condition 2b characterises the 
more optimistic view about the effect of a marginal increase in training investment. 
Compared to the relatively pessimistic view ( B φ ), the optimistic view ( A φ ) is that 
additional training generates a greater upward shift in the probability distribution of 
second period profits.  
We now investigate the relation between the optimistic and pessimistic beliefs and the 
training decisions of establishments. Using (1), we compute the difference between 
optimistic and pessimistic establishments of the marginal effect of training on survival 
probability, evaluated at B’s optimal training decision, tB* :   
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Using 2a and 2b, both terms in the above expression are positive. Hence, relative to 
establishments with beliefs  B φ , establishments with more optimistic beliefs  A φ  will 
choose a training level tA* such that tA*> tB*.  Thus, in this model, differences in the 
amount of training are generated by differences in beliefs about the effectiveness of 
training. 
The relation between the objective expected survival probability and training is given 
by using the objective probability density function,  2 (t, ) o φ Π , in the survival probability 
equation. By the previous assumption that any probability density function generates a 
single maximum survival probability (see footnote 9), the relation between expected 
survival probability and training will trace out an inverted U shape.  Where beliefs 
about the effectiveness of training are pessimistic (optimistic) relative to the objective 
survival probability function, there will be under-investment in training and training 
will have a positive (negative) association with survival probability.  If all views were 
pessimistic relative to the objective density function, it would only be possible to 
observe empirically a positive relation between training and survival probability. The 
aim in the remainder of the paper is to investigate empirically the sign and magnitude of 
the relation between the probability of survival and training.   
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IV. Data 
The data used are from three surveys of the same workplaces at three different points in 
time. The first survey, the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS3), was a 
nationally representative survey of 2061 British establishments with 25 or more 
employees in all sectors except agriculture, forestry and fishing and coal mining. All 
WIRS3 main management respondents who said they did not mind being re-contacted 
were asked to participate in a follow up survey, the Employers' Manpower and Skills 
Practices Survey (EMSPS) conducted between November 1990 and October 1991. 
Once unproductive and out of scope responses were taken into account the EMSPS 
sample was left at 1693 establishments. 
Much of the data we utilise comes from EMSPS which was set up to examine aspects of 
employers' skill formation, including their skill needs, recruitment practices and 
training.
10 In a few cases it was possible to update relevant variables with information 
from EMSPS (the ownership variable is one example). However, we also include some 
information available only from WIRS3. The two surveys were conducted only a year 
apart, and we used only those variables (such as union recognition and number of 
product market competitors) for which it was reasonable to assume that conditions 
present at the time of WIRS3 also prevailed at the time of EMSPS. 
EMSPS has information on a variety of measures of training that has taken place in the 
twelve months prior to the survey. Our focus is on "continuing" training, that is, training 
that is not part of an induction process. The survey provides data for each of up to nine 
major occupational groups in the establishment. We consider two distinct types of 
                                                 
10 For a descriptive analysis of the EMSPS dataset, see Dench (1993). Subsequent 
analyses to have used data from EMSPS include studies of the influence of unions 
(Green et al, 1999) and of high-performance workplaces (Whitfield, 2000) on training.  
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training measure. Our first measure is whether or not the establishment is a training 
provider for either non-manual workers or manual workers or both. The second measure 
is the proportion of employees receiving training, which we take to be an indicator of 
the establishment’s investment in the skills of its workforce. To generate the latter, we 
first compute the establishment’s share of investment in each of nine occupational 
groups, by multiplying the proportion receiving training in each group by the share of 
that group in employment. We then sum the investments for each group to give three 
indicators of training investment: one for all manual occupational groups, one for all 
non-manual groups and one for the whole workforce.
11 Summary statistics of all 
variables used are given in Table A1 of the Appendix.  
The final part of the data comes from the longitudinal element of the WIRS series. As 
part of the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey, a randomly selected sub-
sample of WIRS3 workplaces were followed up and re-surveyed.
12 This consisted of 
1301 workplaces where detailed information on workplace industrial relations at this 
time was collected to compare with information from 1990. In addition to these 
interviews, attempts were made to trace all 2061 WIRS3 workplaces to establish 
whether or not they were still in operation. It is this latter information that we use to 
measure workplace survival. 
Table 1 reveals that of the 1693 establishments in EMSPS, 181 were found to have 
closed down by 1998. Apart from 45 establishments, where we could not be sure 
                                                 
11 The proportion of the total workforce trained is given by: 
9
1
T= ii s τ ∑  where  i τ  is the 
training proportion and  i s  the share of occupation group i. Investment in training for 
manual (non-manual) workers is the sum over just the manual (non-manual) 
occupations. 
12 Full details of the WIRS series of surveys are available at: 
www.niesr.ac.uk/niesr/wers98.   
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whether the establishment was still in operation, all others in the sample were in 
existence. Some of these establishments gave productive interviews, while others had 
either refused an interview or become ineligible for re-interview in some way, or were 
not part of the chosen sub-sample for re-interview. This left a closure rate within the 
sample of 11 per cent over approximately seven years.
13 For the purposes of the rest of 
this paper we focus on closure as a presumed outcome of poor commercial performance, 
and hence restrict our analyses to establishments in the private sector. 
Table 1 
Establishment Outcome of EMSPS Respondents at WERS 1998 
 
Establishment Outcome At WERS 1998  No. of 
Establishments 
   
Unsampled, Not Closed Down  544 
Missing  45 
In Sample, Ineligible or Refused yet Continued  171 
In Sample, Productive  752 
In & Out of Sample Closed Down  181 
   





Table 2 reports the results of a bivariate comparison of closure rates according to 
whether privately owned establishments provide any continuing training. Nearly 19 per 
cent of the sample establishments which did no training closed down, compared with 13 
per cent of establishments which did train. The difference in the proportions is 
statistically significant at the 5% level (p=0.039).  
                                                 
13 Larger establishments and certain industries were deliberately over-sampled in 
WIRS3. The best estimate of the closure rate for the population of British 
establishments with at least 25 workers in 1992, obtained by applying the sampling 
weight, is 12.7 per cent.  
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Of course, it is possible that the returns to training could vary according to where the 
investment is placed. The returns could differ because the deviation of training from its 
optimal level, in the face of poor information, need not be the same for each 
occupational type. A further reason why the returns may differ is that the function of 
training is likely to vary substantially between groups (Felstead et al, 1997). To verify 
this possibility, we considered responses to a direct question asked of management 
respondents to EMSPS. In establishments where the aim “to meet health and safety or 
other legislative requirements” was considered to be “very important”, one half of the 
workforce were manual staff. By contrast, where this aim was “not important” only 17 
per cent were manual workers. Although training in response to legislation or regulation 
is necessary, this function might be less related to the commercial performance of the 
company than are other reported functions of training, which amount to increasing skills 
through which value is added to the product or service. For example, in sample 
establishments where the training aim  “to implement new technology” was very 
important, an average of 55 per cent of employees were classed as non-manual, but 
where this function was not important, only 39 per cent were non-manual. For these 
reasons, we distinguish in much of the subsequent analysis between the effects of 
training investments in the manual and non-manual workforce. 
Table 2 shows that sample establishments which trained at least some of their non-
manual workforce had a closure rate of 12 per cent, compared with 19 per cent for 
establishments which did not train them. This difference is statistically significant at the 
1% level (p=0.006). For manual worker training, the same comparison gives a 16 per 
cent closure rate for non-training establishments as against 13 per cent for training 
establishments, but the difference in these proportions is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels (p=0.21).  
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Table 2   Training and Establishment Closure 






  No Yes No Yes No Yes 











(87.2)  Establishment 












  Total  177 884 234 797 397 646 
 
Note: Private sector establishments only. 
Whilst these observed differences in closure rates are substantial, one should not read 
too much into bivariate comparisons. One reason for caution is that training is more 
prevalent in larger establishments, which are for other reasons (and according to 
previous studies) less likely to close down. Other factors such as unionism or 
establishment age are also likely to be linked to both establishment survival and to 
training. Moreover, the simple comparison in Table 2 does not distinguish between 
establishments that train only a few of their employees and those that train many. 
Accordingly, we present multi-variate probit estimates of the determinants of plant 
closure in Table 3. Apart from training investments, we include controls used in 
previous studies, and report further on the sensitivity of our findings to variations in 
model specification. The table reports the marginal effects on the predicted probability 
of closure, evaluated at the sample means.
14 
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 3 report the ‘raw’ association of training with establishment 
closure for an array of alternative training measures. Column (1) utilises two binary 
variables that capture whether there is any training of non-manual or manual 
employees. Consistent with the conclusion from Table 2, those establishments which 
train at least some of their non-manual workers are about 7 percentage points less likely 
                                                 
14 For binary independent variables, the marginal effect reports the predicted probability 
of closure for a discrete change of the independent variable from 0 to 1.  
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Table 3 The Effects of Employer Training on Establishment Closure 
Dependent Variable: Establishment Closure 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Establishment trains its non-
manual workers (1/0) 
-0.0688 
(2.44)*       
Establishment trains its 
manual workers (1/0) 
-0.0113 
(0.48)       




†      
Investment in training of 











Investment in training of 








“Small” Establishment        
(< 200 Employees) 







Inv. in non-manual training 






Inv. in manual training times 




Non-manual Union       
Recognition 















Proportion of Manual 
Workers 






Proportion of Female 
Workers 






Proportion of Fixed 
Contracts 
































Contracting Product Market 
or Activities 

























Performance  No No No No No  -0.0455 
(1.88)** 
Unemp’t at 1992  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional Dummies (11)  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Controls (9)  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R
2  0.0093 0.0185 0.0220 0.1050 0.1193 0.1799 
Sample  Size  1013  774 774 680 680 537 
 
Notes 
1. For definition of investment in training indicators, see footnote 11. 
2. Parameter t-values in parentheses. 
† denotes significance at 1%; * at 5%; and ** at 10%.  
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to close down (more likely to survive commercially) after seven years than those that do 
not train non-manual workers. In contrast, training manual workers appears to have no 
significant association with establishment survival. 
Column (2) investigates the association with establishment closure of the preferred 
measure of training investment, namely the proportion of all workers receiving training. 
The marginal effect is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, 
its magnitude indicates that raising the proportion of employees in receipt of training by 
10 percentage points would lower the chances of closing down by 1.1 percentage 
points.. Column (3) provides a breakdown of this investment in training into training for 
non-manual and training for manual employees. The estimates reveal that investment in 
training of non-manual employees has a significant negative association with closure. 
However, no such association is observed for manual staff. 
Column (4) extends the analysis of Column (3) and reports results when an array of 
control variables is also included, as suggested by theory and the existing empirical 
studies of plant closure (noted above). The results reveal that the estimated closure 
equation is meaningful and broadly consistent with this previous literature. Manual 
union recognition, for example, appears to raise the chances of plant closure. This 
suggests that the voice effects of manual unions on raising productivity are insufficient 
to compensate employers for the higher wages they pay (thus leading to lower profits 
and a greater risk of plant closure).
15 Non-manual union recognition, by contrast, has no 
significant association with closure. The size and age of an establishment has a 
                                                 
15 The impact, according to Bryson (2001), is only significant for establishments that 
only recognise manual unions, and is somewhat smaller (at 8 per cent) than reported 
here. The difference emerges because here the period covered is different (1991 to 
1998), and because in Bryson’s model part of the union effect goes through the 
industry-level union density variable. 
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significant impact on the probability of establishment closure. Small establishments 
(<200 employees) are less likely to survive commercially then larger ones. Likewise, 
establishments of less than a year’s vintage are much less likely to survive than older 
establishments: the age of the establishment in 1990 is positively related to survival. 
This association could reflect a causal impact of tenure on establishment profits, 
perhaps through a process of organisational learning. Alternatively, the association may 
reflect adverse selection whereby inefficient firms are weeded out over time.  
Evidence concerning the nature and state of an establishment’s product market is 
mixed. Managers of trading establishments were asked if their product market was 
expanding or contracting. Whilst a binary variable for declining product market has a 
positive marginal effect, the estimate is not significantly different from zero. Yet, as 
expected,  the degree of market power exerted by the establishment in the product 
market is significant. Those establishments operating in markets where the manager 
perceives there are no competitors have significantly better chances of survival. This is 
in accord with microeconomic theory: more competitive markets are expected to yield 
lower rents, and hence a lower probability of survival for individual establishments.  
The net effect of including these other determinants of plant closure is to leave almost 
unchanged the coefficient on the proportion of non-manual workers trained. Conditional 
on these other determinants, in the average establishment, raising the proportion of non-
manual workers receiving training by 10 percentage points is associated with a rise in 
the chances of establishment survival by 0.7 percentage points.
16  
                                                 
16 Calculated, using Table 3 column (4), as 1.49 x 0.50, where 0.50 is the share of non-
manual workers in the average establishment. 
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It is well-known that training is more widespread in larger firms and establishments. A 
typical rationale for having less training in smaller establishments is that the costs are 
disproportionately high, at least for formal training. In particular, it is often stated that it 
is difficult to spare workers from direct production activities. The implication is that the 
optimal level of training is greater in large than in small establishments. It is also 
possible that the impact of training on company performance may differ according to 
the size of establishment. In Column (5) we investigate this issue and interact the two 
training investment variables with the binary variable that identifies whether the 
establishment is “small” (less than 200 workers)
17. The estimates show that the 
association between investment in training non-manual workers and plant survival is 
both positive and statistically significant in large establishments of 200 or more 
workers. However, the association in small establishments is insignificantly different 
from zero.
18 
Although our interpretation of these findings has been that investment in training, 
particularly for non-manual employees, does generate above-normal returns and hence 
lower closure rates, it is possible that the conditional correlation being captured in these 
estimates derives from omitted factors that are associated both with training and with 
long-term survival. One such factor might be the financial health of the company. If the 
                                                 
17 It should be remembered that establishments with less than 25 workers were excluded 
from the WIRS sample. 
18 We additionally estimated our regressions utilising the weights provided with WIRS 
that correct for the sample design. The findings reported in Table 3 column (5), and 
subsequent specifications in this paper, are not substantially or significantly affected by 
the use of these weights. However, the specification shown in column (4) did show 
some sensitivity to the use of sample weights, indicating potential mis-specification 
(DuMouchel & Duncan, 1983). Our preferred specification thus includes interaction 
terms between training investments and establishment size. With these included, we 
follow the approach of DuMouchel & Duncan and report only those estimates obtained 




firm is in an especially profitable business, it has a greater chance of survival and it may 
also be able to afford to spend more on employee training. In this respect the training 
might be regarded in part as an employee benefit. Using the WIRS data, it is possible to 
control in part for this possibility. In the 1990 interview, managers of establishments 
were asked to rate the financial performance of their establishment compared with 
others operating in the same industry. It may be hypothesised that above average profits 
persist, at least for more than a year, and hence we assume that the manager’s 
perception in 1990 is a proxy for the extent to which it is an inherently above-average 
profitable company. Thus, in column (6) we input a binary variable for establishments 
which were deemed to be performing higher than average. The result shows that, as 
expected, a more profitable establishment in 1990 was less likely to close down 
between 1991 and 1998. However, the inclusion of this variable made no significant 
alteration to the estimated coefficient on investment in training.
19 
Other omitted factors associated with training and also with survival may be unobserved 
in the data. A possible candidate could be the extent to which management has a long-
termist horizon. A company which looks to the long-term future might have a range of 
strategies for securing long-term prosperity. As part of this strategy it might decide that 
the workforce has a high level of training needs. If so, we might be according too much 
weight to training per se. The effect of the training that we measure in 1991 might also 
be attributable to other training in earlier and subsequent years, since the level of 
training is likely to persist. Alternatively, as the HRM literature hypothesises, the effect 
of training on performance may be linked to the usage of “high-performance” practices. 
Such practices were not well catered for in the design of the questionnaire instrument 
                                                 
19 Due to missing values on financial performance, the sample size in column (6) is 
substantially smaller. However, the conclusion that there is no alteration to the training 
investment effect holds when we restrict the sample size to the 537 non-missing cases.  
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for WIRS3.
20 Since there is no possibility to remove unobserved fixed effects with this 
closure analysis, the fact that high-training establishments are associated in some cases 
with a greater likelihood of survival should only be interpreted as causal if one is 
prepared to assume that the unobserved fixed effects do not generate substantial biases 
in the estimates. 
 
V. Extensions. 
In this section we consider three extensions to our basic findings.  
It is often reported by employers that a reason for not training various groups of 
workers is the fear that their investment would be lost through natural labour turnover 
or deliberate poaching of newly-trained workers. While evidence suggests that training 
does not lead to substantially higher rates of labour mobility (Dearden et al, 1996), it 
remains plausible that training investments will have a larger impact in establishments 
with a more stable workforce. With a very high turnover, any continuing training can 
have only an immediate pay-back. 
Unfortunately, the data do not afford measures of turnover within each occupational 
group, something which would be necessary to test the above idea adequately. 
However, managers were asked to estimate the rate of annual turnover of all staff. We 
therefore defined a new variable as the interaction between reported turnover and the 
                                                 
20 Nevertheless, variables measuring the presence of communication channels, such as 
consultative committees or suggestion schemes, had no significant association with the 
probability of closure. Whitfield (2000) explores the relationship between such 
practices and training. Channels for communication are a necessary ingredient of 
getting employees involved in the establishment, which is at the core of the high-
performance model (Appelbaum et al, 2000). 
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investment in training (proportion of all staff getting trained). Analysis within a probit 
estimation (not shown, available on request) revealed this variable to not be statistically 
significant. Thus, there is no evidence within the context of the data that higher turnover 
negates training investments to any great extent. Nevertheless, this must only be a 
tentative conclusion owing to the lack of good turnover data in the years following 
1991. 
The second extension to our findings is to examine the separate effect on closure of 
investment in training in each of the nine occupational groups. By disaggregating the 
investment in workforce training into the nine constituent groups, we can investigate 
whether training has differential effects across occupational groups, and hence whether 
the discrepancy between training and its optimal level varies across groups.  
The results of including all nine investments separately are shown in Table 4. 
Additional explanatory variables in this specification are the same as that previously 
reported for column (5) of Table 3, and includes interaction terms with the binary 
variable for small establishment size. Column (1) of Table 4 presents the estimated 
coefficient on training investment in each group for a large establishment, whilst 
column (2) presents the estimated coefficients in small establishments, obtained by 
summing the coefficients of the training investment term and the interaction with the 
"small" establishment dummy.  
In large establishments, it can be seen that among non-manual occupations a negative 
association of training investment with plant closure is significant for Sales, Clerical 
and Secretarial, and Professional occupations. However, for Managerial and 
Administrative workers, the coefficient is positive, though insignificant. Thus, there is  
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no evidence that training for managers is below the optimal level. Among the manual 
occupations, none of the training investment has a significant association with closure. 
In small establishments, just as with the more aggregated analysis of Table 3, the 
picture is different. Most training in non-manual occupation groups has no significant 
association with establishment closure, the exception being Professional Associate and 
Technical workers. The point estimate for the coefficient on training for Management 
and Administrative workers is, again, positive.
21 By contrast, among manual 
occupations, three separate types of training investment -- for Operatives and Assembly 
workers, Personal and Protective Service workers, and for Craft and Technical Workers 
-- each have negative and significant links with establishment closure. In each of these 
cases, establishments which trained a greater proportion of their workers in that group 
appear to have enhanced their chances of commercial survival.  This finding contrasts 
with the finding reported from Table 3, where investment in manual training as a whole 
was not found to be significant at conventional levels. The contrast is explained by the 
absence of any impact from training the least skilled occupational group, Routine and 
Unskilled workers. When this group is separated out, it is found that training for the rest 
of the manual workforce taken together reduces the probability of closure in small 
establishments at the 1% level of significance.
22 
                                                 
21 In this case the estimated impact was close to being significantly different from zero 
(p=0.102). 




Table 4     Establishment Closure: Training by Occupation 
Dependent Variable: Establishment Closure    
  (1) (2) 




Management & Administrative  0.295  0.222 
Professional   -0.369**  0.099 
Professional Associate & Technical  -0.168  -0.198* 
Clerical & Secretarial  -0.223
† -0.057 
Craft & Skilled Service  0.077  -0.117** 




Operatives & Assembly   -0.064  -0.109** 
Routine, Unskilled   -0.076  0.062 
    
Pseudo R
2 0.1768 




† denotes significance at 1%; * at 5%; and ** at 10% 
2.  Full specification equivalent to Column 5 of Table 3. 
3.  Column 2 is the sum of the term in column (1) and the relevant interaction term. 
 
 
Finally, as a third extension, we investigated whether estimates of the length of training 
periods had any significant impact on establishment survival. Respondents were asked 
to estimate how many days the trainees in each occupational group received on average. 
Accordingly, we defined a variable from the manager's responses, equal to one if the 
estimated average training period was no more than five days, zero otherwise, and 
interacted this variable with the proportion trained in each group. A substantial number 
of respondents were unable to give any notion as to the length of training period, and 
hence there are more missing values, and a smaller number of observations available 
when this information is included for estimation purposes.  
The resulting probit estimation (not shown here, available on request) indicates that, for 
every group, the length of training period had no additional significant effect on the 
probability of establishment closure, beyond the proportion of workers trained. There 
are two ways to interpret this finding. On one hand, the reports of average training 
lengths may be subject to considerable measurement error. Few if any respondents  
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would have consulted records when answering the question and any substantial 
measurement error would be sufficient to generate large downward biases in the 
estimated coefficients. Alternatively, if the measure is considered accurate enough, one 
can conclude that, even where the proportions being trained are not at their optimal 
level, there is no evidence that the quantity of training per trainee is less or more than 
the optimum. 
 
6.  Conclusion. 
Why do firms provide continuing training for their employees? If not because of 
external regulation, the prime general motive is normally assumed to be to invest in 
future productivity gains. Yet in deciding how much resource to devote to training, and 
where best to allocate it, firms generally lack any precise metric. How a firm benefits 
from training its employees can sometimes be captured through measures of improved 
job performance, but the impact on organisational productivity and a fortiori on profits 
has typically to be a matter of judgement in the face of uncertainty. It is thus quite 
possible for a firm's marginal returns to training investments to be substantively above 
or below a normal rate of return without stimulating an adjustment in the size and 
distribution of its training budget. 
This study has provided, for the first time, evidence of a link between training and the 
commercial survival of establishments. Our best estimate is that, by raising investment 
in training non-manual workers by 10 percentage points, the average establishment 
would have lowered the risk of closure between 1991 and 1998 by about 0.7 percentage 
points. Set against the average closure rate of 13 per cent, such an efficiency gain 
appears modest but worth having. We interpret the finding as evidence that the training  
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investment on average provided ex post an above normal rate of return, thereby 
lowering the risk of commercial failure. The finding implies that on average employers 
in 1991 were unduly pessimistic about the efficacy of training. Moreover, there is no 
evidence of over-investment in training for manual or non-manual workers. This 
conclusion is subject to the usual caveats about inferences drawn from a cross-section. 
Although we have been able to control for the manager's perception of relative financial 
performance in 1990, as well as other determinants of plant closure as suggested by 
previous studies, and although the training investment in 1991 is a pre-determined 
variable in relation to subsequent decisions taken from 1992 to 1998, it remains possible 
that other factors affect closure and are also correlated with the 1991 training 
investments. 
Further investigation suggested that the gains from training varied substantially 
according to which groups were being trained and according to the size of 
establishment. In smaller establishments, our estimates suggest that training for 
Operatives and Assembly workers, Personal and Protective Service workers, and Craft 
and Technical workers was sub-optimal in 1992, in the sense that establishments which 
trained greater proportions of these groups could generate a lower risk of closure. This 
evidence appears to support the view that policies to encourage smaller establishments 
to train workers in these lower-ranking occupational groups would be beneficial for 
employers. However, there is no case found (on grounds of economic performance) for 
more training to be provided for Routine and Unskilled workers. In larger 
establishments, training appeared to be sub-optimal particularly for Sales, Clerical and 
Secretarial, and Professional workers. There was also no evidence of any gains to be 
had from increasing the proportion of Managerial and Administrative workers who  
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receive training. Indeed, in our estimate for small establishments, training for this group 
came close to having a statistically significant negative association with survival.
23 
An implicit assumption underlying a series of government initiatives in Britain has been 
that firms could do better for themselves by raising their training effort. Yet, such an 
injunction has typically lacked weight (and arguably been ineffectual) because there 
was no reason to suppose that government officials had superior information to 
employers about the private returns to training.
24 
For policy-makers, it is likely that the prime task remains that of addressing 
externalities, credit restrictions and associated inequality of access in the training 
market (Policy Innovation Unit, 2001). Nevertheless, the provision of objective 
information is also a public good; such a rationale underpins public policy in several 
areas of the education and training market. Statistical studies such as this one of the 
relationship between training and firm performance cannot help individual employers to 
determine the returns to their own training budget. However, information about how 
training is associated with performance, gleaned from a large number of establishments, 
can contribute to the information set upon which private judgements are made, and 
assist policy-makers whose aim may be to affect the amount of employer training 
through the dissemination of information, without the need for costly public subsidies 
or unpopular levies. 
                                                 
23 It is notable that, between 1992 and 2000, training participation increased by a few 
percentage points for most occupational groups, but for Managerial and Administrative 
workers appeared to remain unchanged. 
24 By encouraging firms to raise training governments may also be aiming to raise 
training closer to a socially optimal level, which is above the private optimum level 
owing to externalities and credit constraints (Stevens, 1999).  
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Table A1:  
Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Establishment 
    
Establishment Characteristics  Mean SD 
  Establishment Closed at 1998  0.137   
  Training at Establishment  0.909   
  Manual Training at Establishment  0.696   
  Non-manual Training at Establishment  0.847   
Investment in Training (proportion of employees getting training)  0.485  0.381 
  of which:     
Training Non-Manual Workers  0.281  0.313 
of which:      
Managerial and Administrative  0.044  0.060 
Professional 0.030  0.093 
Professional Associate & Technical  0.036  0.097 
Sales   0.083  0.199 
Clerical & Secretarial  0.089  0.171 
Training Manual workers  0.205  0.276 
of which:     
Craft & Skilled Service 0.062  0.125 
Personal & Protective Service  0.018  0.090 
Operatives & Assembly   0.081  0.178 
Routine, Unskilled   0.044  0.121 
  Manual Union Recognition  0.503   
  Non-manual Union Recognition  0.441   
  Proportion of Manual Workers  0.504  0.331 
  Proportion of Female Workers  0.273  0.203 
  Proportion on Fixed Contracts  0.013  0.075 
  Establishment is UK Owned  0.799   
  Single Independent Establishment   0.162   
  No Competitors   0.394   
  Market for Product Primarily International  0.178   
  Declining Product/Service Market or Activities   0.254   
  Age <1 year at time of WIRS Original Survey  0.022   
  Age 1-10 years   0.222   
  Age 11-20 Years  0.196   
  Age 20+ years   0.560   
  < 200 Employees at Establishment  0.557   
  Regional Unemployment (%) at 1992  9.605  1.068 
1-Digit Industry Affiliation    
  Energy and Water Supplies  0.035   
  Minerals, Metal Manufacture and Chemicals  0.068   
  Metal Goods, Engineering and Vehicles  0.184   
  Other Manufacturing  0.169   
  Construction  0.029   
  Distribution, Hotels and Catering  0.246   
  Transport and Communication  0.047   
  Banking, Finance, Insurance & Business Services  0.144   
  Other Services   0.078    
  35
 
Regions    
  Greater London  0.163   
  Rest of South   0.181   
  East Anglia  0.029   
  South West  0.062   
  West Midlands  0.084   
  East Midlands  0.063   
  Yorkshire  0.090   
  North West  0.124   
  North  0.056   
  Wales  0.043   
  Scotland  0.106   
N  680 
 